Digestion: Rethinking the Long Tail Theory

Photo by Amanda Gyllenhaal

Photo by Amanda Gyllenhaal

There’s a bit of dis­cus­sion right now about a work­ing paper com­ing from Ser­guei Netes­sine and Tom F. Tan at Whar­ton that’s won­der­ing how solid the Long Tail effect really is.  A lot the crit­i­cism seems to come down to some definitions:

Ander­son is also author of The Long Tail: Why the Future of Busi­ness Is Sell­ing Less of More. The key dif­fer­ence between the opin­ion of the book and the study by Whar­ton researchers is how they define “hits” and “niches.” In the book, Ander­son focuses on the def­i­n­i­tion of hits in absolute terms such as the top 10 or top 1,000 prod­ucts, while Netes­sine and Tan argue that, to take grow­ing prod­uct vari­ety into account, one has to define pop­u­lar­ity in rel­a­tive terms, such as the top 1% or top 10% of prod­ucts, to prop­erly assess the pres­ence or absence of the Long Tail.

The ques­tion of absolute v. rel­a­tive def­i­n­i­tions can obvi­ously be looked at either way, but it seems to me that the real ques­tion is not how many total prod­ucts are avail­able (rel­a­tive) but how many prod­ucts are avail­able that would not be were Net­flix not shoot­ing for the niches.  That is, if we define a hit as the top 1% and 3000 movies are stocked by a stan­dard brick and mor­tar com­pany that isn’t capa­ble of the logis­tics of being a Long Tail busi­ness, then the top 30 movies are the hits across the entire indus­try.  For there to be a mean­ing­ful com­par­i­son between stan­dard and Long Tail you’d have to con­sider that Long Tail is based on the premise that inven­to­ries are expand­ing and that is one of the things it is look­ing at, not try to cal­cu­late the expand­ing inven­to­ries into the def­i­n­i­tion of hits and niches.  So I guess I have to agree with Ander­son on that one.

Of course, this def­i­n­i­tional ques­tion doesn’t change some of the very good points that the paper brings up about how the Long Tail effect is being used now.  The most impor­tant one to me is the crit­i­cal­ity of rec­om­men­da­tion sys­tems in a Long Tail busi­ness.  All those niche prod­ucts are just over­head if con­sumers don’t know they’re there.  Net­flix is obvi­ously aware of the prob­lem, given that the data used in this study was released by Net­flix as part of a mil­lion dol­lar con­test to improve their rec­om­men­da­tion sys­tem.  Based on my own expe­ri­ence as a Net­flix cus­tomer, I have to say improve­ment is sorely needed–though I might ques­tion whether the rec­om­men­da­tion sys­tem itself is the issue or the hor­ri­bly non-browsable inter­face Net­flix uses.  (Well, really inter­faces plural, since a large part of the prob­lem is how they bounce back and forth between dif­fer­ent looks depend­ing on how you get to the data…but that’s a dif­fer­ent discussion.)

It makes me won­der how much social rec­om­men­da­tions are actu­ally use­ful for Net­flix.  I don’t use that sys­tem myself, and it wouldn’t be vis­i­ble in the data used in this study which was just of rat­ings data, but it seems like improve­ments to the social tools used by Net­flix would pro­vide a far supe­rior rec­om­men­da­tion sys­tem to the algo­rithms devel­oped in the com­pe­ti­tion.  For me, the issue is the lack of con­trol that Net­flix gives its cus­tomers.  For instance, I don’t have any abil­ity to choose which movies I’ve rated or rented will be vis­i­ble to which friends in any sort of gran­u­lar way.  There’s no offi­cial inte­gra­tion between the closed “Net­flix friends” com­mu­nity and other social net­works, at least that I can find on Netflix’s site.  That alone would be incred­i­bly valu­able; the idea of social net­work­ing is to make the per­son the cen­ter of knowl­edge, not the net­work, and Netflix’s friends don’t allow that.

via Rethink­ing the Long Tail The­ory: How to Define ‘Hits’ and ‘Niches’ — Knowledge@Wharton.

Digestion: Users Love Stupid Content

Image by Kevin Marks

Image by Kevin Marks

Twit­ter has become a play­ground for imbe­ciles, skeevy mar­keters, D-list celebrity half-wits, and pathetic atten­tion seek­ers: Shaquille O’Neal, Kim Kar­dashian, Ryan Seacrest. Sure, some seri­ous peo­ple, like George Stephanopou­los and Al Gore, use Twit­ter. And a lot of pub­lish­ing com­pa­nies and blog­gers (myself included) use Twit­ter to send links to arti­cles we’ve pub­lished. But most of what streams across Twit­ter is junk. One recent study con­cluded that 40 per­cent of the mes­sages are “point­less babble.”

via Twitter’s Pop­u­lar­ity: Users Love Stu­pid Con­tent | Newsweek Daniel Lyons | Tech­tonic Shifts | Newsweek.com.

Really?  40% of Twit­ter mes­sages are “point­less bab­ble”?  Maybe it’s just me, but com­pared to tele­vi­sion, radio, blogs, and, well, every­day con­ver­sa­tions, that’s an amaz­ingly good signal-to-noise ratio.

While Daniel Lyons catches up with those of us who have seen Idioc­racy, a cou­ple of other thoughts:

  • $55 mil­lion in ven­ture cap­i­tal I can see.  But is some­body going to pay $1 bil­lion to acquire Twit­ter, the com­pany that has trum­peted how uncon­cerned it is with mak­ing money?
  • Twit­ter has an audience…but what kind of audi­ence is it?  Twit­ter users have become accus­tomed to fil­ter­ing their mes­sages pre­cisely because of the spam, inane com­ments, and mis­di­rected per­sonal replies that fill the net­work.  How respon­sive are Twit­ter users going to be com­pared to users of tra­di­tional web sites?
  • The intro­duc­tion of AdSense to gmail was one of the key moments in turn­ing Google from the “don’t be evil” com­pany into a bur­geon­ing Big Brother.  It was seen as sig­nif­i­cant for two rea­sons:  the ads were being placed in the con­text of per­sonal com­mu­ni­ca­tions, and Google was scan­ning email for key­words to tar­get ad place­ments.  Twit­ter would be vul­ner­a­ble to the first claim, but what about the sec­ond?  It seems like con­tex­tual place­ment would be the best/only way to effec­tively adver­tise on Twit­ter, but with that be sub­ject to as big a back­lash as gmail saw?
  • Twitter’s ser­vice is already pretty bad, quite frankly.  Con­stant server out­ages, flaky search, and no real sup­port sys­tem adds up to a ser­vice that prob­a­bly would have been aban­doned were it not free.  Are users going to put up with bad ser­vice when they have to see ads as well?  Are adver­tis­ers going to pay to place ads on a net­work that always seems to be a stiff breeze away from collapse?

Digestion: Is Social Advertising an Oxymoron?

Frank Rose’s Wired col­umn asks if adver­tis­ing on social net­work­ing sites is inher­ently a flawed process because users aren’t inter­ested in adver­tis­ing in the same place that they’re talk­ing to their friends.  (Ted McConnell, head of inter­ac­tive mar­ket­ing and inno­va­tion at Proc­ter & Gam­ble, even has the price­less quote: “What in heaven’s name made you think you could mon­e­tize the real estate in which some­body is break­ing up with their girl­friend?”)  But after read­ing Rose’s rea­son­ing, I’m left with a few questions:

  • What in heaven’s name made any­body think adver­tis­ing was a good idea any­where?  Haven’t adver­tis­ers been com­plain­ing that view­ers skip ads ever since the inven­tion of the VCR?  Much less the DVR, TiVo was sup­pos­edly the death knell for the entire ad-supported TV system.
  • Along sim­i­lar lines, what made any­body think click­throughs are a good way to mea­sure the effec­tive­ness of adver­tis­ing?  The click­through rate on tele­vi­sion ads is 0%, same as news­pa­pers, mag­a­zines, and the lit­tle blow-in cards that fall out of cat­a­logs.  Until the web, adver­tis­ers never expected imme­di­ate response to their ads, so a con­sumer could be sit­ting at home watch­ing TV, inter­act­ing with their fam­ily (for cer­tain val­ues of “inter­act­ing”) and still be con­sid­ered a valid tar­get for ads.  Why is the goal of TV ads long-term brand recog­ni­tion and the goal of web ads imme­di­ate reaction?
  • There’s a key line in this arti­cle:  “[…] at least viral videos pro­vide some enter­tain­ment value — which is a lot more than you can say for those Social Ads on Face­book.”  Social ads fail because they do not pro­vide enter­tain­ment.  Despite Ted McConnell’s ideas, there is no rea­son why peo­ple are unwill­ing to mix social­iz­ing with adver­tis­ing, as long as the adver­tis­ing is actu­ally enter­tain­ing.  Do TV ads just show a screen full of text for 30 sec­onds?  Of course, peo­ple are annoyed with TV ads and would be with web ads as well; but there is an inher­ent quid pro quo in adver­tis­ing, and when view­ers don’t feel they’re get­ting their eyeball-time’s-worth, they’ll com­pletely shut down.
  • Rose focuses on astro­turfed ads on YouTube made by tra­di­tional ad com­pa­nies and notes that, not only do peo­ple know they’re astro­turfed, but they don’t even gen­er­ate any money for YouTube itself.  That’s changed some­what, as YouTube has been mak­ing more and more spon­sored videos avail­able.  But that is only half of the prob­lem Rose discusses…the other half is that the astro­turfed ads are still being made by ad com­pa­nies and so they don’t fit in with the rest of YouTube’s con­tent.  Why is there not a pro­gram where YouTube takes adver­tis­ing con­tracts and makes them avail­able as con­tests for user-generated con­tent?  The adver­tiser gets their ads, YouTube gets a cut for host­ing, and actual users get paid for the con­tent they’re mak­ing (and prob­a­bly far less than the ad com­pany they’re replac­ing, so the adver­tiser actu­ally ends up sav­ing money in the end).  Adver­tis­ing on broad­cast is easy because com­pa­nies are good at mak­ing broad­cast ads; adver­tis­ing on peer-to-peer requires buy­ing in to the entire peer-to-peer mind­set and mak­ing ads that fit the medium, even if that means let­ting some­body else make them for you.

Digestion: What’s Your Viral Loop?

Photo by Aldo Frullini

Image by Aldo Frullini

Think­ing about Andrew Chen’s What’s your viral loop? Under­stand­ing the engine of adop­tion:

  • Under­stand­ing that Chen is specif­i­cally focus­ing on viral loops, it’s still inter­est­ing that he lists the last step in the process as find­ing onramps–that is, iden­ti­fy­ing the media that will sup­port the loop you’re try­ing to build.  I can see the the­ory is that you have con­trol over your loop and so it should be designed first with the idea that it should sup­port many dif­fer­ent onramps, but I see it as a bit of a chicken and egg sce­nario.  He’s mak­ing the assump­tion that your loop will exist in an eas­ily portable con­tainer like Flash and so you can there­fore wait until the end, but what hap­pens if you have a ser­vice that requires more?  (I know easy answer is to redesign the ser­vice, but that’s not always possible.)
  • Chen’s tech­niques include con­sid­er­ing the con­tent, but are mostly con­tent neu­tral and assume you’re try­ing to draw peo­ple into a ser­vice.  What hap­pens when you’re only deal­ing with con­tent, though?  A blog, for exam­ple, has no inher­ent lock-in and the only real oppor­tu­nity to have it go viral is by pig­gy­back­ing off other dis­tri­b­u­tion for­mats like social net­works.  What’s more, those still only really pro­mote indi­vid­ual posts, not the ser­vice itself.  Users com­ing from a viral post have to go upstream and make the deci­sion to add the blog to their social net­work / rss / twit­ter / book­marks / brows­ing habits.
  • Not sure how much I like his enthu­si­asm with forc­ing the shar­ing step ear­lier and ear­lier into the fun­nel.  Maybe it’s just me, but I always find this behav­ior to be obnox­ious.  (Face­book is really bad, the amount of in-your-faceness pretty much turned me off to the site com­pletely.)  Chen talks about los­ing a lot of poten­tial users at every step of the loop, so why give them another rea­son to leave?  It seems to work off the same the­ory as spam, but I ques­tion what the dif­fer­ence is between total users and qual­ity users.
  • Con­tin­u­ing that last thought, this arti­cle really high­lights that viral loops are about ini­tial con­t­a­m­i­na­tion, not ongo­ing use.  It’s the dif­fer­ence between Ebola and a chronic case of Hepati­tis C.  Ebola is self-limiting because it burns through its host too quickly to allow it to spread (thank­fully).  Hep C can live in a host for decades and use its host to spread for that entire period.  Viral mar­ket­ing efforts so far seem to be mostly focused on the Ebola model; what would it take to design a viral cam­paign around the Hep C model?  Or even bet­ter, cre­at­ing a legion of Typhoid Marys?  That might go back to why viral cam­paigns are gen­er­ally not good at branding.

Digestion: The Problem with Viral Branding

A few thoughts on Dou­glas Holt’s “The Prob­lem with Viral Brand­ing”:

  • It’s impor­tant to remem­ber that Holt is specif­i­cally address­ing brand­ing in this piece, which is fun­da­men­tally dif­fer­ent than pro­mo­tion of a sin­gle project, prod­uct, or piece.  The idea of cre­at­ing an “iconic brand” is to build up an icon that peo­ple will iden­tify with a spe­cific set of traits; beer com­pa­nies are great at this because they asso­ciate hang­ing around with friends and sex with their brand even though those ideas have absolutely noth­ing to do with the intrin­sic qual­i­ties of the prod­ucts they’re sell­ing.  So a brand is meant to be endur­ing and apply to mul­ti­ple products–when Bud­weiser comes out with their new Bud Blue­berry, their cus­tomers will still asso­ciate sex and friends with it even though that spe­cific prod­uct has never been adver­tised that way.  Pro­mot­ing a sin­gle meme has dif­fer­ent require­ments and so many of Holt’s crit­i­cisms of viral brand­ing don’t nec­es­sar­ily apply to viral loops in the sense we’re try­ing to apply them.
  • You’ve got to love his hor­ror that Snap­ple launched a pro­mo­tional cam­paign “with­out so much as a focus group”!
  • Holt cor­rectly iden­ti­fies opin­ion lead­ers (Lim­baugh and Stern) as being crit­i­cal to any viral cam­paign.  How­ever, I’m not sure that he appro­pri­ately sees them as accel­er­a­tors of the process so much as crit­i­cal parts.  While they are impor­tant, par­tic­u­larly in mak­ing sure that a viral cam­paign grows fast enough that it doesn’t burn out its ini­tial pop­u­la­tion, the effect of opin­ion lead­ers can some­times be replaced by deal­ing with broader networks.
  • I’m glad Holt talks about under­stand­ing what was going on in the larger cul­ture as part of under­stand­ing why Snap­ple was suc­cess­ful, know­ing where your piece fits into the big pic­ture of what­ever pop­u­la­tion you’re try­ing to infect is crit­i­cal to devel­op­ing the right viral strategy.
  • One thing that Holt seems to gloss over, though, is that one of the rea­sons Snapple’s viral strat­egy worked so well was because it was matched to the brand myth it was car­ry­ing.  Match­ing pay­load to car­rier is very impor­tant.  I think that Holt’s glid­ing past this point led him to incor­rectly con­clude that Snapple’s viral effects were effect, not cause.
  • He does rein­force that qual­ity of the pay­load is impor­tant though, which is always nice to hear from a mar­ket­ing person.
  • One last weak­ness that he men­tions bears look­ing at fur­ther:  viral cam­paigns are author­less.  This was a point I thought of when we looked at the Con­ta­gious Media Project.  While I had heard of all but one of the projects listed on that page, I never knew that they all came from the same source.  This also goes back to the weak­ness of brand­ing, if you con­sider the artists involved in those projects to be ‘brands’.  Not that this can’t be coun­tered, but it is some­thing to be aware of when deal­ing with viral campaigns.